HABEAS CORPUS: REQUIREMENT OF EXHAUSTION OF
STATE REMEDIES BEFORE ISSUANCE OF WRIT LIMITED
TO STATE OF DETENTION
IT is well settled that before a federal court will issue a writ of
habeas corpus to a prisoner in a state penal institution,1 the peti-

tioner must first exhaust the remedies afforded to him by state law.2
However, because of the uncertainty as to what constitutes exhaustion of state remedies, this requirement has been the source of
much litigation.3 Typically the issue of exhaustion is confined to
a determination of whether the petitioning state prisoner has exhausted all remedies of the state of incarceration. In the last few
years, in the State of New York, a new dimension has developed.
Under a multiple offender statute, 4 the New York state courts have
taken notice of prior out-of-state convictions to increase sentences
awarded in criminal proceedings. The problem of what constitutes
exhaustion of state remedies is thus compounded when a prisoner
bases his petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that
the previous out-of-state conviction was unconstitutional and cannot
support a longer sentence. New York federal courts have consistently implied, in such instances, that the petitioner must show
exhaustion of remedies in both the state of original conviction and
the state of present detention.5 In the recent case of United States
ex rel. LaNear v. LaVallee.,6 however, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit refused to follow this line of precedent.
Petitioner was convicted of second degree burglarly in a New
York state court, and, because of a prior Missouri conviction, 7 was

IJurisdictional

authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners stems

from 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1958).
The early cases held that habeas corpus would issue only if the committing tribunal
lacked jurisdiction. However, as time passed, the federal courts, under the guise of a
jurisdictional defect in the committing tribunal, began to issue the writ when a basic
question of procedural fairness was involved. Today, courts customarily ignore the

jurisdictional question and proceed directly to the constitutional issue alleged in the
petition.

See Note, 61 HARV. L. Ray. 657 (1948).

-28 U.S.C. §2254 (1958).

(This requirement originally a judicial development.)

See note 13 infra.
8
See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394 (1959); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953);
Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944); Note, 61 HAav. L. REv. 657 (1948).
'N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1941.
5
See cases cited note 16 infra.
0 306 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1962).
*Petitioner's prior conviction was for burglary. For an out-of-state conviction to
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sentenced to a longer term than he would have received as a first
offender. 8 Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed on the
ground that the Missouri conviction violated the due process clause
of the federal constitution, 10 and hence could not serve to support an
extended sentence. No allegation was made concerning any attempt
to exhaust state remedies in Missouri, and as a result, the district
court denied the petition, holding that exhaustion requirements
included" 'reasonable effortsof a state court prisoner to obtain relief
in the court of a sister state wherein it is claimed that the requirement of due process has been violated.' " The Second Circuit, in
reversing and remanding, held that the exhaustion requirement
2
applied only to the state of present detention.
Although the present requirement that state remedies must be
exhausted prior to a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus is
statutory, originally it was a judicially developed doctrine 3 based
support punishment under the multiple offender statute, the accused must have been
convicted "of a crime which, if committed within this state, would be a felony...."
N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1941. Designation of the crime by another state does not determine
the nature of the offense for the purpose of the New York statute. See People v.
Stovali, 172 Misc. 469, 15 N.Y.S.2d 498 (Kings County Ct. 1939) (recital of acts must
conclusively establish their felonious character under New York law).
8 Had it been his first offense, the sentence would have been "for a term not
exceeding fifteen years," with no minimum stipulated. N.Y. PEN. LAws § 407. However, the multiple offender statute required that he be sentencd "for an indeterminate
term, the minimum of which shall be not less than one-half of the longest term prescribed upon a first conviction, and the maximum of which shall be not longer
than twice such longest term." N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1941. As a result, the sentence was
for an indeterminate term of fifteen to thirty years. 306 F.2d at 418.
9A prisoner is not required to serve the maximum sentence he might have
received as a first offender before he may apply for a writ. It is only necessary that
the petitioner might have been sentenced to a term which would have already expired.
For a summary of decisions, see United States ex rel. Foreman v. Fay, 184 F. Supp.
535, 538-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
10
In support of his contention of denial of due process, petitioner alleged that prior
to arraignment in his previous Missouri conviction, he had been confined for over a
month without being apprised of the precise nature of the offense with which he was
charged; and that although he was destitute and thus unable to hire a lawyer, the
court failed to inquire concerning assignment of counsel. Moreover, petitioner related
that at the time of his conviction, which was based upon his plea of guilty, he was
under seventeen years of age and was barely literate due to having acquired only
a fourth grade education. 306 F.2d at 418.
11306 F.2d at 419 (quoting district court).
12 306 F.2d at 419. The court further stated that since New York provided no
method for testing the validity of out-of-state convictions used to support a multiple
offender sentence, the petitioner could proceed directly in a federal court. Id. at 421.
Thus the result of this case is that in New York petitioner need not establish that he
has been in either state court.
"- The stautory requirement of exhaustion is embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958).
As indicated by the revisers' notes, this section gives legislative recognition to the
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primarily on two policy considerations. Foremost is the importance
of preserving harmonious relations or comity between state and
federal court systems. The essential principle behind the comity
doctrine is that a court currently cognizant of an issue in question
should defer action until another court with prior jurisdiction has
had an opportunity to act on the matter.1 4 Another policy factor
involves practical recognition of the limited administrative capacities
of the federal judiciary; were it not for the exhaustion requirement,
the federal court would be overwhelmed with petitions. 16
In nearly all of the small number of cases which have arisen
involving the problem presented in the instant case, New York
federal courts have assumed, without explicitly deciding, that the
petitioner was required to exhaust the remedies of the sister state.1 0
But in two cases, New York federal courts have unqualifiedly held
that a petition for issuance of a writ should be denied if the petitioner failed to exhaust his remedies, in the state of the first conviction. 17 Refusing to follow these precedents in the instant case,
exhaustion rule formulated in Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944). In the Hawk
case, the Supreme Court stated that "ordinarily an application for habeas corpus by
one detained under a state court judgment of conviction for crime will be entertained
by a federal court only after all the state remedies available, including all appellate
remedies in the state courts and in this Court by appeal or writ of certiorari, have
been exhausted." Id. at 116-17. See also Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204-14
(1950), for a discussion of the background of the exhaustion requirement and the
legislative history of § 2254.
", For a discussion of comity and its relation to the problem of exhaustion of
remedies, see Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204-08 (1950), and cases cited therein.
", This limitation was recognized in Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 679 (1948).
"6See United States ex rel. Cutrone v. Fay, 289 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1961); United
States ex reL. Moore v. Martin, 273 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 563 U.S.
821 (1960); United States ex reL Farnsworth v. Murphy, 254 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 358 U.S. 48 (1958); United States ex rel.
Savini v. Jackson, 250 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1957); United States ex rel. Smith v. Jackson,
234 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1956); United States ex rel. Atkins v. Martin, 228 F.2d 188,
189 (2d Cir. 1955) (dictum); United States ex rel. Farnsworth v. Murphy, 207 F.2d
885, 887 (2d Cir. 1953) (alternative holding); United States ex rel. Turpin v. Snyder,
183 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1950). However, there lias been no requirement of exhaustion
of the remedies of a foreign jurisdiction. See United States ex reL. Dennis v. Murphy,
265 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1959); United States ex rel. Foreman v. Fay, 184 F. Supp, 585
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
Toler v.
'7Davis v. Jackson, 246 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1957); United States ex rel.
Martin, 186 F. Supp. 267 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). In the Davis case, petition for rehearing
was granted when petitioner demonstrated a lack of an available remedy in Florida.
This reversed the previous unrecorded order of the circuit court in which the court,
assuming coram nobis was available in Florida, required the petitioner to exhaust
the remedies in that state. 246 F.2d at 269.
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the court found support both in the language of the statute and its
underlying policies.
The court held, as a matter of statutory construction, that the
provisions of the statute refer only to the state pursuant to whose
judgment the petitioner is being detained. 18 The validity of this
conclusion seems to be supported by the language of the statute for
it implies that Congress envisioned only the situation where the
state of contested conviction and the state of detention are the
same. Furthermore, the court concluded that its interpretation of
the statute fully satisfied the policy considerations that are the basis
for the exhaustion requirement. 10
At first blush it might appear that by so construing the statute
the comity doctrine was ignored since, upon remand, the Missouri
conviction may be declared void without the Missouri courts being
given the opportunity to hear the question. However, a closer
analysis reveals that this is not the usual situation in which the
comity doctrine is applied. Missouri's situation is not that of an
offended state whose judgment has been overturned by a federal
court and whose prisioner has been released. On the contrary, the
judgment has been fulfilled and the sentence served. As the court
pointed out, petitioner's real complaint was not against Missouri,
rather "in every practical sense his grievance [was] . . . over what
New York [was] ... doing with what Missouri did." 20 Furthermore,

any judgment that the conviction is void should have no effect in
Missouri since it will merely be a determination that the conviction
is an impermissable basis for a more severe sentence in New York.
Whatever indignity a determination that the conviction is void may
inflict on Missouri would seem to be balanced by the fact that the
state is spared the trouble of resurrecting an old conviction whose
sentence has probably been served.21
28 "An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that
the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that
there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
"An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the
courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the
law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented." 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (1958).
(Emphasis added.)

10 306 F.2d at 420.
20 Ibid.
21 There is always the possibility that defendant was under suspended sentence for

the prior conviction.
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However, even if it were deemed that the comity doctrine had
some application in the instant case, it is submitted that the court
decided wisely. Such recognition would have brought the comity
doctrine into direct conflict with the traditional concept of the
remedy of habeas corpus as a means of securing speedy relief from
wrongful detention. In a larger context, this historical function of
the writ impliedly involves the duty of the federal courts under the
fourteenth amendment to protect individuals from state denial of
due process of law. In this situation the restraint imposed by the
comity doctrine must yield to the stronger policy considerations
22
implicit in the remedy of habeas corpus.
There is ample justification for the supremacy of the comity doctrine in the single state situations where the interest of the state
is great, and the exhaustion requirement imposes no unreasonable
delay. However, nothing warrants its extension into the two-state
situation. Not only are the policy reasons for applying comity much
weaker where two states are involved, but also the additional
burdens placed on the petitioner run counter to basic policy underlying the habeas corpus proceeding. This is evidenced by the fact
that attempts to seek post conviction relief in the state courts even
in the single state situation have resulted in fruitless wastes of time
and eventual resort to the federal courts usually becomes necessary
23
before relief can be obtained.

To extend the exhaustion requirement to the state of prior
conviction in the instant case would have required not only an
illogical reading of the statutory exhaustion requirements and a
misconception of the underlying policy factors of the comity doc2

- For an analogous situation in bankruptcy proceedings see In re Agawam Racing
(D. Mass. 1946), where the comity principle of
allowing a state court to adjudicate a valid claim over which the state court had
assumed jurisdiction prior to bankruptcy proceedings yielded under the particular
fact situation to the Federal Bankruptcy Act's stronger policy of protecting general
creditors.
23 See Reitz, FederalHabeas Corpus: Post-Conviction Rcmedy For State Prisoners,
108 U. PA. L. REv. 461 (1960). Conceivably, however, because of a greater availability
of evidence, it might be advantageous to instigate coram nobis proceedings in the
state of original conviction. In the instant case the court specifically stated that in no
way is this decision to affect such a possibility. 306 F.2d at 421 n.5. Thus, the
practical result is to furnish the petitioner with alternatives from which to choose.
This is a complete reversal of the court's position in Davis v. Jackson, 246 F.2d 268
(2d Cir. 1957), where, because it was believed coran nobis was available, petitioner
was required to pursue it. See also note 17 supra.
9- Breeders Ass'n, 65 F. Supp. 755
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trine, but also a willingness to ignore the traditional rights of the
individual. By refusing to employ such tortured construction, the
court in LaNear v. LaVallee thereby manifested once again the
increasing concern of federal courts in the preservation of constitutional rights in state criminal proceedings.

